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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Policy and Management

25X1 SUBJECT: Comments on SECOM Long Range Plan Report  
Draft [redacted]

REFERENCE: 27 June 1984 Draft Report from  
Maynard Anderson

1. I reviewed Mr. Anderson's draft report on 29 June, and found that it tracks very closely the minutes of the Working Group's deliberations. I have the following comments: [redacted]

25X1 ° I believe we should go slow on the Section III item on "the fact of, or degree of religious commitment, (sic) if any." If nothing else, I would not make it the first item on the list. It is an area which can be reported on when volunteered by informants. It is certainly a significant area, but its mention surprised those in Policy and Plans Group with past Clearance Division experience. The exercise of religion is carefully protected by the Constitution; intelligence agencies must operate within those Constitutional boundaries. [redacted]

25X1 ° The last paragraph of Section IV seems to me full of things we already know without an Artificial Intelligence "Red Agent" computer model. We know what caused Pearl Harbor then, and we know pretty well what could cause it now. SECOM is already actively working Behavioral Science issues. Devoting scarce resources to building computer models seems to me less productive than providing training to new adjudicators on criteria that are already well established. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Chief, Special Security Center, who attended the SECOM Behavioral Sciences Seminar on 28-29 June, told me just this morning that [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] reported to the group that the most effective adjudicative mechanism is a comparison of the Personal History Statement, the background investigation, and the "gut feeling" of the experienced adjudicator.

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While it is true that we are most concerned about something like 2 percent of the cleared population who turn out to be problems, I am not convinced that fitting that 2 percent into some sort of computer-designed matrix is going to catch the potential culprit. There is still a lot to be said for the human experience element in adjudications. In my opinion, intelligence agencies can ill afford to ignore that experience. [redacted]

25X1

° The draft suggests in Section VII that SECOM should attempt to establish itself in a position of policy prominence in (the computer security area.) I would submit that it already has, at least in the area of SCI computer security. DCID 1/16 is proof, and there is close coordination between the SECOM Computer Security Subcommittee and those involved in the Dr. Ruth Davis Intelligence Community computer study. [redacted]

25X1

° The draft suggests in Section IX that if a community-wide leak data base concerning intelligence information is established, SECOM should ensure continuing patterns and trends analysis. It is my understanding that such a move is already underway, in that FBI Director Webster has approved the assignment to SECOM of an individual who will be assigned that responsibility. [redacted]

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE FOR POLICY

27 June 1984

*Memo for* Central Intelligence Agency



The attached draft report with cover memorandum  
is the final version, I hope. I've prepared  
it on the basis of your comments.


If you have additions, or corrections, please  
advise as soon as possible.

I hope to present it to the Chairman on  
11 July.

  
Maynard Anderson

Attachment

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SECOM Long-range Plan Working Group

Reference is made to your memorandum, SECOM-D-013, of 18 January 1984, which established subject group to examine SECOM's role in the current environment; evaluate how well SECOM is fulfilling that role; review SECOM-monitored DCI security policies and procedures to assess their relevance and to determine the need to expand, contract or modify them; and, propose a broad program to guide SECOM activities for the next several years.

The Working Group has examined, reviewed and evaluated SECOM's role in today's world. In order to arrive at an assessment, we have considered the environment of the activity; the organizational setting, and the available assets. We have done this in the context of the perceived risk to the assets that we are obligated to protect in accordance with the SECOM mission, intelligence sources and methods. Our goal was not merely to correct any problems that we identified, or perceived, but to attempt to institutionalize, to some extent, the process of refining the SECOM's system of control over its activities.

We did not review SECOM-monitored DCI security policies and procedures to assess their relevance and to determine the need to expand, contract or modify them because it was concluded that such review is the mission of the various subcommittees and working groups of the SECOM, in the cases of specific disciplines, and the Committee as a whole in general mission fulfillment.

With this preface, the Long-range Plan Working Group submits the attached report, in the form of a series of recommendations, as proposals for your consideration.

Maynard C. Anderson  
Director  
Security Plans and Programs

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